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he  postwar  era  is  not  the  first  experience  the  world  has  had  with 
globalization in all its dimensions. The current episode can, however, 
be distinguished from its nineteenth century predecessor by its scale—a 
world of six billion inhabitants, massive movements of goods, services, and 
capital—as well as by continuously falling communication and transport costs 
and  the  instantaneous  nature  of  information  flows  and  stakeholder  reaction 
possibilities.  When  war  and  interwar  autarky  ended  in  1945,  international 
trade was first to pick up, followed by a renewal of public capital movements, 
initially to Europe and subsequently to developing countries. Next came private 
portfolio capital and foreign direct investment (FDI), quickly dwarfing public 
capital flows, known as Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
The economic migration of people, excluding refugees and asylum seek-
ers, has lagged substantially behind. That’s largely because barriers to the move-
ment of people remain high—despite calls and considerable action for increased 
freedom of trade, capital, and associated technology mobility. This dimension 
of globalization tends to cause the strongest political resistance; when domestic 
workers are seen to be threatened by some combination of technology change, 
imports, and immigrants, it is invariably the last of these that generates the largest 
rhetorical and policy response. 
Nevertheless, pressures for enhanced migration are rising, certainly in the 
less-developed origin (O) countries but also in some quarters of the more de-
veloped destination (D) countries. The very fact that migration has lagged sub-
stantially behind the other dimensions of globalization also makes it the largest 2  Gustav Ranis
opportunity for additional global welfare gains—especially today, when further 
multilateral trade liberalization is in considerable doubt. We will, therefore, focus 
on migration and its interactions with the other elements of globalization as they 
impact development. In this context, we will find it useful to distinguish between 
the costs and benefits to the O and D countries while differentiating between the 
movement of skilled and unskilled migrants. The first section concentrates on the 
movement of the unskilled and its relation to the other dimensions of globaliza-
tion, while the second attempts the same with respect to the skilled. The final 
section suggests some conclusions for policy within the same broad globalization 
framework.
Migration of the Unskilled
The unskilled migrant represents the largest potential benefit to global wel-
fare even as the distribution of gains between O and D countries remains con-
troversial. The desire to migrate by the unemployed, underemployed, and those 
employed at very low incomes in developing countries is a function of the avail-
ability of information, geographic distance, gaps in prospective lifetime incomes, 
and the perceived probability of gaining employment in the D country. The abil-
ity to migrate, on the other hand, depends on some combination of family in-
come levels, access to credit markets, government support, the extent of diaspora 
corridors abroad, and the level of entry barriers erected by the D countries. As in-
dicated in Figure 1, picturing Mexico as a typical case, we can expect the desire to 
migrate to dominate both the private ability to do so and the D countries’ barrier 
levels. In some O countries, such as the Philippines, the government may step in 
by providing both information and financial support in return for the promise of 
enhanced remittances, which tends to shift up both the desire and ability curves. 
However, to the extent that immigration barriers remain the dominant constraint 
(X marks the actual level of migration), there will be increasing pressure to at-
tempt illegal entry. 
The benefits of unskilled migration are clear to the O country. Given that the 
O country is likely to find itself in a labor surplus condition, the withdrawal of 
even substantial numbers of unskilled workers from meager-paying rural or, more 
likely, urban informal business sectors is not likely to affect output significantly. 
Indeed, given the probability of family subsidization of underemployed relatives, 
plus positive adjustments in technology as a consequence of such departures, 
productivity is likely to rise and poverty to decline. 
The O country accrues other substantial benefits. Chief among these is the 
receipt of remittances, which not only substantially enhance family incomes but 
also have important dynamic spillover effects. Such receipts are likely to encour-Migration, Trade, Capital, and Development: Substitutes, Complements, and Policies  2
age additional entrepreneurial and investment activities by those left behind and, 
probably as important, innovative activities by returning migrants who have had 
new windows and contacts opened to them while abroad. This is especially true 
since the D country is likely to be a more advanced market economy. But even 
in relatively advanced, developing O countries such as Pakistan, which has sent 
temporary migrants to the Middle East, evidence from its North-West Frontier 
Province has shown that returned migrants make important entrepreneurial, hu-
man capital as well as financial capital contributions. 
Mexico, for example, receives $20 billion to $25 billion in remittances an-
nually, exceeding FDI flows ($18 billion in 2004) and providing an estimated 
20 to 30 percent of its microenterprise capital (Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). In 
2000, unskilled workers in the U.S. earned roughly six times more than unskilled 
workers in Mexico (Freeman 2006). An individual’s average annual gain by mov-
ing to the U.S. is thus estimated at $10,000, which, over a working life, amounts 
to a roughly $250,000 differential—clearly undergirding the desire to migrate, 
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the U.S. The Philippine case is not too different, except that the government has 
been more directly involved in supporting emigration via the provision of infor-
mation and credit advances. Between 1975 and 1986, the number of Philippine 
contract workers moving to other parts of Asia increased from 4,200 to 76,650, 
and those moving to the Middle East rose from 1,552 to 262,758.1 In 2003, remit-
tances amounted to 10.2 percent of GDP, up from 2.7 percent in 1990.2 Globally, 
remittances reached $150 billion in 2004, almost three times ODA, with an esti-
mated additional $50 billion underreported (Maimbo and Ratha 2005). In some 
O countries, remittance flows have risen to 40 percent of export earnings and 20 
percent of GDP. These flows have clearly helped reduce poverty rates and had an 
equalizing effect on the distribution of income.
Remittances, as well as capital inflows such as ODA and private capital, sub-
stitute for unskilled labor migration. To the extent such inflows generate equitable 
growth, the income gaps between the O and D countries will decline and the 
desire to migrate will fall even as the ability rises. If after some time the country is 
successful in reaching East Asian newly industrialized country status, or Kuznets’ 
(1973) epoch of “modern economic growth,” the D country’s import barriers will 
at some point, beyond X, no longer be binding (Figure 2). 
Remittances have additional advantages in comparison with other types of 
capital inflows. For one, they are likely to be more dependable, fluctuating less. 
For another, they are likely to be countercyclical, increasing in times of eco-
nomic decline or natural disasters, while other types of private capital often act 
cyclically. Moreover, remittances are less likely to cause Dutch disease problems, 
either of the narrow or the extended variety, 3 because they typically are broadly 
dispersed and frequently end up in the hands of rural and urban-informal sector 
families. With respect to the traditional, narrow variety, that means remittances 
are less likely to cause a strengthening of the currency and a shift from exportable 
to nontraded goods—especially if they are used for entrepreneurial investment 
rather than purely consumption activities. Turning to the extended variety, which 
we define as the political economy consequence of capital inflows that tend to 
take the pressure off and permit governments to avoid reforms, remittances again 
are much less likely than foreign aid to be a source of reform obstruction and the 
object of rent-seeking and corruption.
The most important substitute for unskilled labor migration is trade, which 
incorporates such labor in the form of labor-intensive commodities that are sent 
to the D country under the radar. Unfortunately, while trade has virtually ex-
ploded in the postwar era, early liberalization efforts have recently tended to run 
out of steam, and neoprotectionist measures such as antidumping provisions and 
exemptions from preferences, targeted especially at textiles, shoes, and other la-
bor-intensive commodities, have been on the rise.
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gration is the inflow of technology, especially if it is adaptable to the more la-
bor-abundant environment of the O country and thus enhances the potential of 
keeping unskilled labor productively employed at home or embodied in exports. 
Indeed, I would place much more weight, whether discussing the impact of 
migration, trade, or capital, on such dynamic dimensions rather than on static 
comparative-advantage and efficiency criteria.
In summary, various other dimensions of globalization can act as substitutes 
for unskilled labor migration. Moreover, the economic benefits of such migration 
for the O country are overwhelmingly clear. On the negative side of the ledger, 
we can record the not-inconsiderable social costs incurred as a result of pro-
longed family separations as well as the risks of exploitation and ill treatment of 
migrants, temporary or permanent, in the D country. 
Turning to the benefits and costs of unskilled migration with respect to the 
D country, the situation is somewhat less clear. The arrival of “cheap labor” from 
abroad is usually greeted by much more political flak than the arrival of “cheap 
goods” incorporating “cheap labor.” Yet both serve the interests of dispersed D 
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country consumers because the former may encourage the survival, at least for a 
time, of relatively sick or defensive industries, while the latter directly enhances 
consumer welfare. The other benefit, increasingly recognized, especially in rich 
D countries suffering from low birthrates, is that large-scale migration by over-
whelmingly young workers is necessary to help support the welfare and safety-
net packages of the indigenous elderly population. We can safely assume that 
such pressures in the future will be even greater because of continuously falling 
birthrates and rising life expectancies. It is, moreover, a fact that there are jobs at 
the lower end of the occupational totem pole, mostly in agriculture and personal 
services, which D country workers are reluctant to take and which have been 
increasingly filled by unskilled immigrants. In this important sense, unskilled im-
migrants are substitutes for capital, increase labor force participation rates, and 
thus enhance the D country’s productive capacity.
Nevertheless, resistance to the admission of unskilled migrants continues to 
be formidable in almost all D countries. The key objection, emanating mainly 
from unions and their political allies, focuses on the cost in terms of lowering 
indigenous unskilled worker wages, as we would expect from economic theory. 
Nevertheless, what empirical evidence we have casts doubt on the robustness of 
this effect. David Card (2001), for example, examining such national experiments 
as the Mariel boatlift and Algerian inflows into France, finds only relatively minor 
negative wage impacts on earlier migrants and virtually none on indigenous un-
skilled workers. All in all, from a global welfare point of view, unskilled migration 
from poor to rich countries seems to have large benefits for both sides; yet, it is 
clearly the most controversial and most restricted of all globalization flows. Here, 
politics and both intentional and unintentional misperceptions decidedly trump 
economics.
Migration of the Skilled
When we attempt to examine the costs and benefits for both the O and D 
countries of high-talent labor migration, the story is quite different. The benefit to 
the O country is still the contribution such migrants make to the volume of remit-
tances, although the spending pattern of these somewhat more well-to-do left-be-
hind families is likely to be somewhat different—more oriented toward additional 
consumption than investment. Still, on the benefit side, skilled migrants are likely 
to stimulate others in the O country to seek additional education in preparation 
for future migration, thus increasing the average level of education. Moreover, 
there is a good chance that such migrants will ultimately return once the home 
country has reached a certain level of income and opportunity. This has certainly 
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tion technology specialists, and others leaving Silicon Valley and its equivalents, 
returning home—sometimes after many years—and contributing in a major way 
to the growth of high-tech industries in the O countries.
But there are also costs to be considered, especially in the short run, when a 
poor O country loses valuable human capital in which it has invested substantial 
educational expenditures. This perverse movement of human capital—from poor 
to rich countries—has occasioned much discussion and policy debate in the past, 
including Bhagwati’s (1976) suggestion of an exit tax and equally unimplemented 
efforts to restrict long-term stays abroad by legal/contractual means.
While high-talent manpower is clearly needed to support the O country’s 
development efforts, all too frequently the educational structure’s yield is not 
suited to the needs of the contemporary economy, creating a mismatch with po-
tentially explosive political consequences. A well-known case is the highly skilled 
unemployed in Sri Lanka. In such circumstances, unless the domestic educational 
production function can be reformed so that the output is better suited to the de-
veloping country’s needs, emigration may provide the only possible escape valve. 
On the other hand, there are cases, including the Philippines, where it is official 
policy to generate skilled labor—in this instance, doctors and nurses—specifically 
for purposes of export and remittances. This is seen not as a cost but as a benefit 
to society.
In the D country, where unskilled immigrants can generally be viewed as 
substitutes for capital, skilled labor is likely to constitute a complement to the rich 
country’s capital, both physical and human. While D country immigration barriers 
are therefore usually friendlier to skilled immigrants than to the unskilled, empiri-
cal evidence indicates that the negative impact of such arrivals on the incomes 
of their indigenous counterparts is likely to be larger than what we find for the 
unskilled. 
Unless the skilled arrivals fill a particular, relatively poorly serviced, non-
competitive niche or, in a dynamic context, are in a position to help generate 
new economic activities, they ultimately represent a greater threat to the income 
levels of their domestic counterparts than the unskilled do. Nevertheless, given 
their modest numbers and a relative absence of union opposition to their arrival, 
skilled immigrants are likely to meet much lower political resistance. Moreover, 
the recognition that they help overcome specific shortages and/or provide en-
trepreneurial energy and generate precious technology change, especially in the 
knowledge industries, is more likely to carry the day, certainly in the more dy-
namic D countries. In the case of the U.S., for example, it has been estimated that 
a 10 percent increase in the number of foreign graduate students raises patent 
applications by 4.7 percent, and we all know of the contribution of Chinese and 
Indian migrants to the science and technology explosions in Silicon Valley.292  Gustav Ranis
Conclusions for Policy
It should be abundantly clear that the enhanced south–north migration of 
both unskilled and skilled individuals would not only increase global welfare 
but would almost certainly benefit both the O and D countries. At present, since 
migration is clearly the most constrained of the various dimensions of globaliza-
tion, it also offers the greatest potential for future gains. This potential emanates 
not only from the fact that it is a static substitute for or complement to the other 
elements of globalization but also because, as we have noted, it has a potentially 
important, dynamic catalytic impact.
International trade has exploded since 1950, rising twenty-five fold, much 
faster than per capita income. Even if the Doha Round cannot be resuscitated, 
we can expect trade to continue to grow—if at somewhat lower rates—since it is 
generally recognized to represent a positive sum game even if the gains are not 
equitably distributed, as between north and south. The arrival of foreign capital, 
shifting from ODA in the immediate postwar era to private flows, can also be ex-
pected to continue to expand. The same can be said of the transfer of technology, 
even though trade-related property rights issues do still need to be sorted out.
The most obvious policy conclusion, but also the most difficult to implement, 
would be for the D countries to lower their barriers to migration, especially those 
curbing the unskilled labor variety. When domestic producers and labor unions 
in the so-called sunset industries feel threatened by a combination of technology 
change, competitive imports, and the arrival of migrant workers, it is usually the 
last—more visible and threatening—that is likely to bear the brunt of restrictive 
actions. While politics here is usually in a good position to trump rationality—just 
as it is with the traditional emphasis on reciprocity in trade liberalization nego-
tiations—nowhere else is the problem as pronounced as in the realm of inter-
national migration. The resistance is usually more modest to the flow of skilled 
immigrants because they can be defended as net helpful to the local economy. 
Even as pressures mount to accept more immigrants, whether for demograph-
ics, business interests, entrepreneurial renewal, or job characteristics, most rich 
D countries, including Japan and the U.S., prefer to close one eye to illegal im-
migration rather than lower official barriers. This holds generally in spite of the 
serious humanitarian and rule-of-law-related side effects. The recently passed U.S. 
immigration legislation, focused on penalties and border fences, can be seen as a 
response to this general attitude. 
Multilateral negotiations to reduce migration barriers have never been tried. 
Given the convergence of issues relating to trade and immigration, such a func-
tion might sensibly be lodged in the World Trade Organization. With services 
now included in WTO negotiations, this would represent a rational extension—
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rich and poor countries. Though there are legitimate worries about further over-
loading that body, this would appear to be a better option than working with the 
toothless International Organization for Migration—or creating yet another new 
look-alike institution.
A second policy option, emphasized in the 2005 report of the United Nations 
Global Commission on National Immigration, would be to generalize member 
countries’ “best practice” related to guest worker arrangements. For example, 
it recommended multilateral consideration of a South Korean program forcing 
temporary migrants to deposit a proportion of their earnings in a special savings 
account that is forfeited if “temporary” threatens to become “permanent.” 
A third policy option would be the installation of a much more effective trade 
adjustment-assistance program in D countries so that, given the simultaneous ar-
rival of immigrants and imports, affected domestic workers could be retrained 
and moved into “sunrise industries.” Discussion during the WTO Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference in December 2005 suggested focusing ODA more on the 
facilitation of trade. Such an initiative could include moving toward a global trade 
and migration adjustment-assistance program that is administered by the World 
Bank or the WTO, financed mainly by D countries’ ODA contributions, and fol-
lows multilaterally negotiated rules of the game. Foreign aid spent at home in this 
fashion is likely to yield a higher return to D country taxpayers. Inevitably, when 
all is said and done, elements of globalization can lead to some job losses in the 
D countries. The reaction has varied from minimal state intervention in the form 
of a rather ineffective adjustment-assistance program, plus a rather flexible labor 
market, in the U.S. to substantial public purse support combined with strict gov-
ernment controls over the labor market in France. Perhaps the best model may be 
found in Denmark, which combines a generous public safety net with a relatively 
flexible labor market. But since all, especially emerging, countries will not have 
the same budgetary capacity, assistance from outside may be warranted. Even in 
the absence of major changes in the international rules of the game, O countries 
can provide systematic information and even financial support to potential mi-
grants, both temporary and permanent, as in the case of the Philippines. Improv-
ing credit access may serve to reduce the demand and simultaneously enhance 
the ability of unskilled would-be migrants to move—thus reducing the potentially 
explosive gap previously referred to.
One way to be helpful in this regard is by facilitating the flow of remittances, 
which can make important financial as well as entrepreneurial contributions to 
the O countries’ development while incurring much smaller risks than other capi-
tal flows with respect to either the narrow or broad definition of Dutch disease. 
Given the rapidly increasing realization of remittances’ importance to both par-
ties, special efforts should be made to reduce exorbitantly high remittance trans-
fer fees in the D countries. 29  Gustav Ranis
But, ultimately, the only reliable way to reduce expected lifetime income 
gaps between individuals in the O and D countries is to enhance participatory, 
or labor-absorbing, development in the former. With Mexican immigrants to the 
U.S. benefiting to the extent of approximately $250,000, a reduction of such huge 
expected income gaps for an individual Mexican and, as important, for his or her 
children, undoubtedly is required. And that, in turn, requires successful develop-
ment in the O country—mainly a domestic affair but one that can be assisted from 
the outside. How to do this effectively extends beyond the scope of this paper.4
Notes
1  Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, www.poea.gov.ph/default.htm.
2  International Organization for Migration, www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp.
3  In general, the term Dutch disease refers to the case where a sudden appreciation of a country’s 
currency renders the (tradable) manufacturing sector less competitive and leads to a decline 
in  manufacturing  output  and  employment  (de-industrialization).  This  phenomenon  was  first 
observed in the Netherlands in the 1970s, where the discovery of a major natural gas field 
caused a sudden and strong appreciation of the Dutch exchange rate and subsequent decline 
in manufacturing activity.
4  See, however, Ranis (forthcoming).
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